

How Smart is Intelligent Fuzzing - *or* - How Stupid is Dumb Fuzzing?

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Agenda

- Introduction
- Portable Network Graphics
- libpng
- Mutation vs Generation Based Fuzzing
- Conclusions

Introduction

- “Intelligent fuzzing usually gives more results” - Ilya van Sprundel
- Can we quantify this statement?
- How important is the choice of inputs for mutation-based fuzzing?

Fuzzing

- Generate test cases - files, network traffic, command line arguments, environment variables, etc.
- Test cases should be “close” to real program inputs but should contain anomalies
- Test cases fed into the target application which is monitored for faults
- These anomalies are meant to defy programmer assumptions and find bugs

How to Get the Test Cases

- Mutate existing inputs (*dumb fuzzing*)
 - § Take a valid input, say a file, and make changes to it
 - § These changes can include modifying bytes, adding strings, %n's, etc.
 - § Easy and fast to do
 - § Doesn't require knowledge of the program or protocol
 - § Dependent on the existing inputs

How to Get the Test Cases (Cont)

- Generate inputs from protocol description (*Intelligent fuzzing*)
 - § Start from RFC or documentation
 - § Generate inputs based on documentation
 - § For each field in the description, add an anomaly, such as a long strings, negative numbers, %n's etc
 - § Takes a long time to create the inputs
 - § Tedious work
 - § Requires **complete** knowledge or program or protocol
 - § Since all possible fields are fuzzed, *should* be more thorough

PNG Specification

- 8 byte signature followed by “chunks”
- Each chunk has
 - § 4 byte length field
 - § 4 byte type field
 - § optional data
 - § 4 byte CRC checksum
- 18 chunk types, 3 of which are mandatory
- Additional types are defined in extensions to the specification (I look at 21 types; the number known by libpng)

Sample PNG File

The screenshot shows the VisFuzz application window with the file 'stpatrick.png' open. The main display area is split into two panes. The left pane shows a hex dump of the file's contents, with the first few lines highlighted in green. The right pane shows a corresponding ASCII representation of the hex data, with the 'PNG .. IHDR' header clearly visible.

Hex	ASCII
00000000 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A 00 00 00 0D 49 48 44 52	PNG .. IHDR
00000010 00 00 00 1A 00 00 00 14 08 03 00 00 00 A4 9E DD	.. PLTE [] .6.\$
00000020 8C 00 00 02 FD 50 4C 54 45 00 00 00 36 B7 24 FF	.. JJJ .. ?
00000030 FF FF EE 12 12 4A 4A 4A FF B0 12 EE EE 12 1F 3F	\$\$\$2 .. u
00000040 C0 A0 A0 A0 4F 6F DF CC CC CC B0 B0 B0 1C 75 1D	..
00000050 24 24 24 32 CB FE A2 09 0A 11 11 11 12 12 12 13	..
00000060 13 13 14 14 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17 17 17 18 18	..
00000070 18 19 19 19 1A 1A 1A 1B 1B 1B 1C 1C 1C 1D 1D 1D	..
00000080 1E 1E 1E 1F 1F 20 20 20 21 21 21 22 22 22 23	..
00000090 23 23 24 24 24 25 25 25 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 28	!!"###
000000A0 28 29 29 29 2A 2A 2A 2B 2B 2B 2C 2C 2C 2D 2D 2D	##\$\$%&%'((
000000B0 2E 2E 2E 2F 2F 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 32 33	())**+++ ,,---
000000C0 33 33 34 34 34 35 35 35 36 36 36 37 37 37 38 38	...///0001112223
000000D0 38 39 39 39 3A 3A 3A 3B 3B 3B 3C 3C 3C 3D 3D 3D	3344455566677788
000000E0 3E 3E 3E 3F 3F 40 40 40 41 41 41 42 42 42 43	8999:;:;<<====
000000F0 43 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 46 46 46 47 47 47 48 48	>>>??@AAAABBBB
	CCDDDEEFFFGGHH


Below the hex dump is a tree view showing the file's structure. The 'Specification' folder is expanded, showing the 'PNG header' with its hex value and CRC. The 'Chunks' folder is also expanded, showing the 'IHDR chunk' selected, with its sub-elements: 'Block size' (00 00 00 0D; 13), 'IHDR CRC block', and 'IHDR crc (correct)' (A4 9E DD 8C; -1931632988). Other chunks like 'Palette Chunk', 'Background Color Chunk', 'Physical Pixel Dimension Chunk', 'Image Last-modification time chunk', 'Image Data Chunk [0]', and 'Image Trailer Chunk' are listed but not expanded.

PNG's From the Wild

- Collected 1631 unique PNG files from the Internet
- Each file was processed and the chunk types present in each was recorded
- Typically, very few chunk types were present

Number of files	Mean number of chunk types	Standard deviation	Maximum	Minimum
1631	4.9	1.3	9	3

Distribution of Chunks Found




Observations

- On average, only five of the chunk types are present in a random file!
- 9 of the 21 types occurred in less than 5% of files
- 4 of the chunk types never occurred
- Mutation based fuzzers will typically only test the code from these five chunks
- They will *never* fuzz the code in chunks which are not present in the original input

libpng

- libpng is an open source PNG decoder
- Used in Firefox, Opera, and Safari
- We want to check that each chunk type really has unique processing code
- We generate PNG's containing the 3 mandatory and then one more chunk type
- We use gcov to record code coverage while it processes fuzzed versions of this type (approximately 1000 files per type)

Code Coverage for Each Chunk Type



Number of lines of code required to process each type as a percentage of the total number of lines required to process a minimal PNG file

So...

- Some chunk types require more code than others for processing
- The 4 chunk types which were not found in the wild represent 76% more code than a minimal PNG.
- This code will not be fuzzed using a mutation based method

Mutation vs Generation Based Fuzzing

- Generation based fuzzing is *better*... but how much better?
- How much does mutation based fuzzing depend on the input being mutated?
- We examine the case for PNG and libpng

Experiment 1

- We ran a mutation based fuzzer (similar to FILEfuzz) starting from 3 PNG's.
 - § 5 chunk types (most likely to be used by chance)
 - § 7 chunk types (unlikely to be used by chance)
 - § 9 chunk types (extremely unlikely)
- For each file, we tested the application with 100,000 test cases.


Experiment 2

- The existence of the CRC's may completely hinder the mutation-based fuzzer.
- We used the same starting file and same fuzzer as experiment 1.
- We ensured that the CRC's were all corrected before testing the application.
- Again used 100,000 test cases.

Experiment 3

- Used SPIKEfile and the PNG specification to generate fuzzed PNG's.
- Fuzzed all 21 chunk types as well as the length, CRC, and chunk name fields.
- Generated 29,511 test files.

Results



Number of lines executed as a percentage of code required to fuzz a minimal PNG file

Conclusions

- Mutation based fuzzing is very dependent on the inputs being mutated.
- Choosing the right inputs can double the amount of code executed with mutation based fuzzing.
- Generation based fuzzing is substantially better in this case
- In this case, 2-5 times more code may be executed using generation based fuzzing over mutation based.
- All this is specific to the fuzzers used and this specific filetype.

Does This Generalize?

- Who knows?
- Related information
 - § In “Fuzzing: Brute Force Vulnerability Discovery”, they examined 10,000 SWF files

SWF Version	% of Total
Flash 8	< 1%
Flash 7	2%
Flash 6	11%
Flash 5	55%
Flash 4	28%
Flash 1-3	3%

Questions?

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